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Fiscal Decentralization, Economic Growth and Human
Resource Development in Nigeria: Autoregressive Distributed
Lag (ARDL) Approach
Elijah Udoh1, Udoma Afangideh2, and Elias A. Udeaja3
There is a widespread belief that fiscal decentralization is an effective tool for
increasing the efficiency of public expenditures. Decentralization is expected
to boost accountability and transparency in the provision of public goods for
the well-being of the society. However, countervailing views maintain that
little or no impact has been created at the periphery in terms of improving the
welfare of the people in Nigeria. The main objective of this paper was to
investigate how the decentralized system of expenditure impacted on human
resource development in Nigeria. Using ARDL/Bounds Testing approach and
data for the period 1980 to 2012, the study found that expenditure
decentralization exerted negative effect on human resource development. The
pattern and nature of expenditure decentralization in Nigeria, in the long-run,
seemed to support inefficient application of resources with increased cost of
governance rather than ensuring cost effectiveness in the provision of public
services. The study recommends that transparency and accountability at all
levels of government is required to make fiscal decentralization supportive of
economic growth and human resource development.
Keywords: Fiscal decentralisation, inter-government fiscal relations, Nigeria,
Human resource Development, Economic growth.
JEL Classification: H71, H72, H77
1.0

Introduction

Over the past few decades, decentralization of social and development
responsibilities has become an important feature of political and economic
reforms in many countries. Decentralization has been defined as the process
by which a central government formally cedes powers to actors and
institutions at lower levels in a political-administrative and territorial
hierarchy (Mawhood, 1983; Smith, 1985). It refers to a politico-administrative
arrangement in which the authority to plan, make decisions and manage public
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functions, are transferred from the central government to subordinate
organisations, agencies or units of governments either geographically or
structurally (Anyanwu, 1999). It has thus translated into a growing role for
sub-national governments, not only financially but administratively and
politically as well, in the national efforts to hasten progress towards economic
and human development.
There are three functional areas of decentralization from central to subnational
governments: i) fiscal powers; ii) policy responsibilities and iii) service
delivery roles. These functions correspond to Musgrave’s framework of three
core government functions of: stabilization, distribution and allocation
(Musgrave, 1964; Musgrave and Musgrave, 1989). First, stabilization involves
using tax, spending and monetary policies to influence economic activity.
Second, distribution involves policies on redistribution of national income and
wealth for equitable development. Lastly, allocation involves assignment and
use of public resources (spending) to produce public goods and services for
the well-being of the masses (Eboh, 2009).
Specifically, fiscal decentralization is defined as the devolution of policy
responsibilities from the central government towards sub-national
governments with regards to spending and revenue collection (Neyapti, 2004,
2010). The increased interest in fiscal decentralization is based on the
following: i) the widespread belief that fiscal decentralization is an effective
tool for increasing the efficiency of public expenditures, even though it may
carry some risks vis-a-vis other desirable objectives of government policy,
such as horizontal fiscal imbalances across sub-national governments and
macroeconomic stability;4 ii) fiscal decentralization is expected to boost
accountability and transparency in the provision of public goods (de Mello,
2000); iii) tax-payers are expected to better cooperate with local governments
that are accountable than with large centralized bureaucracies (Wasylenko,
2001). Moreover, local jurisdictions are able to exploit their physical and
functional closeness to the people in getting better understanding and
perception of local needs for public services (Ekpo and Englama, 2008).
4

See, for example, Oates (1972), Bahl and Linn (1992), Guess et al. (1997), Spahn (1997),
Burki et al. (1999) and Shah (1999).
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The motivation for this study emanates from the overview of the empirical
literature on the benefits of fiscal decentralization. Most recent empirical
works have focused on the direct impact of fiscal decentralization on
economic growth.5 Fiscal decentralization enhances economic growth directly
by increasing efficiency of public expenditures (Samuelson, 1954; Barro,
1990) and indirectly by enhancing economic efficiency, creating horizontal
fiscal equality and by maintaining macroeconomic stability (MartinezVazquez and McNab, 2006, Iqbal and Nawaz, 2010). However, over the
years, economists have become more concerned with the nature of economic
growth. This is borne out of the observation, especially among developing
countries in Africa, who, despite high growth rates of the GDP, have
continued to suffer severe human deprivation and poverty. In this regard, Agu
and Onodugo (2009) examine infrastructure decentralization in Nigerian states
and their impact on poverty reduction. They argue that while immense social
benefits may accrue from infrastructure decentralization in developing
countries, practical experience shows that the service delivery challenge at the
sub-national level may thwart the economic efficiency of such
decentralization.
In similar manner, Binder and Georgiadis (2010, 2011) examined the role of
institutions on human development using a dynamic panel modelling
framework which can account for the crucial aspect of both the cross-sectional
and inter-temporal features of the observed development process. Among
other findings, their study shows that macroeconomic policies affect
development with less delay than suggested by conventional econometric
frameworks. In addition, they found that institutions and macroeconomic
policies affect economic development with much more delay than they affect
economic growth measured as gross domestic product (GDP). The variables
used in this study as measures of institution and macroeconomic policies were
trade openness, government consumption and investment in physical capital.
This study differs from Binder and Georgiadis in two main dimensions: First,
it is a country’s case study and not panel. Secondly, instead of concentrating
on macroeconomic policies as measures of institution, it focuses on fiscal
decentralization.

5

The list of recent empirical investigations focusing on the direct relationship between fiscal
decentralization and economic growth includes: Zhang and Zou (1996, 1998), Davoodi and
Zou (1998), and Lin and Liu (2000).
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature on
the link between fiscal decentralization, economic growth and human resource
development. Section 3 presents stylized facts and trends in fiscal
decentralization, economic growth and human resource development. Section
4 sheds light on the methodology and data used for the empirical analysis.
Section 5 reports the estimation results while section 6 provides some
concluding remarks.
2.0

Literature Review

The conceptual and theoretical issues involved in fiscal decentralization and
intergovernmental fiscal relations are fully discussed in a number of studies
(Ekpo and Ndebbio, 1991; Aigbokhan, 1999; Ekpo and Ndebbio, 1998; Shah,
1991; Shah, 2006; Eboh, 2009). According to the decentralization thesis, the
production of local outputs for local demands by local authorities rather than
by central authorities constitutes the building blocks for maximizing national
social welfare. Certain goods and services are best provided through public
means at the lower levels. Indeed, where the consumption of a public good is
dominated by spatial scope, there is economic merit for lower jurisdictions to
assume responsibility.
On the revenue side, there are equally certain taxes, levies and rates that are
better collected by the lower layers of governments. However, in most
countries, the logic for central collection of revenue is usually in general
stronger than that of centralizing expenditure responsibilities. According to
Musgrave (1973), sub-national levels acting as central expenditure agents do
not reflect expenditure decentralization in a meaningful sense. In the same
vein, centrally collected but shared taxes do not imply proper revenue
centralization. An important issue arising from the foregoing in recent times
has been the need to resolve the mismatch between expenditure functions and
revenue powers. In the Musgrave framework, “finance must follow function”,
that is, expenditure functions should be matched with revenue powers.
To escape this financial gap, federations often involve in re-distribution in the
gamut of the central government assuming part of the responsibility for
financing constituent units of government responsibilities. In Nigeria, this
takes the form of sharing in federally collected taxes and different types of
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transfers (both matching and non-matching) from the federal government. The
justifications for these revenue sharing and transfers are well-documented in
Boadway (1990), Shah (1983) and Anderson (2010). They include:
(i)

The need to contribute to the general financial requirements of all
sub-national units
(ii)
The need to reduce disparities in the fiscal means of the subnational units
(iii)
The desire to promote central government’s policy objectives with
the other tiers of governments.
Tax sharing and transfers combined account for over 90 percent of subnational finances in Nigeria, Mexico, and South Africa; and about 50 percent
in Austria, Germany, India and Australia (Anderson, 2010).
In the context of the focus of this study, it would be interesting to find out
how the pattern of fiscal assignments and transfers translate to economic
growth and human resource development. A number of studies have shown
that fiscal decentralization has positive impact on macroeconomic stability.
King and Ma (2001), Neyapti (2004) and Neyapti (2010), for instance, find in
cross–section of countries drawn from both developed and developing
countries that revenue decentralization lowers inflation, reduces budget
deficits and thereby leads to stable macroeconomic environment. According to
these studies, the impact of fiscal decentralization in achieving
macroeconomic stability is stronger if it is accompanied by central bank
independence, local accountability and good governance.
On the contrary, Shah (2006) and Thornton (2007) in separate studies found a
positive relationship between macroeconomic instability and fiscal
decentralization. Treisman (2000) separated between developed and
developing countries in a panel of 87 countries. The results showed that fiscal
decentralization helped preserve central bank independence in OECD (or
developed) countries while in non-OECD (developing) countries, it increased
pressures on the government to overspend and get the central bank to
monetize the deficit.
Feltenstein and Iwata (2005) gave an empirical investigation of the impact of
fiscal and economic decentralization in China on the country’s economic
growth and inflation, using a vector autoregressive (VAR) model with latent
variables. Their results showed that economic decentralization appeared to be
positively related to growth in real output for the entire postwar period in
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China. However, fiscal decentralization seemed to have adverse effect on
price stability and positive on economic growth.
Marinez-Vazquez and McNab (2006) using panel data set for 52 developing
and developed countries for the period 1972-1997, examined the direct and
indirect relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth and
macroeconomic stability. They found that decentralization might positively
influence price stability in developed countries, though this impact is much
less clear in developing and transitional countries. They also found some
evidence suggesting that decentralization might directly and negatively affect
economic growth in higher income countries but that this effect was reduced
through the indirect positive impact of decentralization on growth through
macroeconomic stability.
There are also a number of country-specific studies on the effects of fiscal
decentralization on economic performance. Zhang and Zou (1996) for India
and Lin and Liu (2000) for China, found a positive and significant influence
on economic growth while Zhang and Zou (1998) for China and Davoodi and
Zou (1998) for the United States, in contrast, found a generally opposite
results that fiscal decentralization was associated with slower growth.
With respect to Nigeria, Aigbokhan (1999) found a negative influence of
fiscal decentralization on the economic growth of Nigeria, using various
measures of fiscal decentralization and a Barro-type endogenous growth
model. In another study, Udah and Ndiyo (2011) investigated the impact of
fiscal decentralization on macroeconomic stability, economic growth and
external balance. Their results showed that both revenue and expenditure
decentralization negatively influence economic growth. Amongst other
factors, Aigbokhan (1999) and Udah and Ndiyo (2011) identified corruption
as the main culprit behind the adverse effect of fiscal decentralization on
economic growth. Other reasons for the negative impact of fiscal
decentralization on economic performance include poor quality of local
bureaucracy and limited capacity of sub-national governments to implement
sound macroeconomic policy.
It would be wrong at this point to conclude that fiscal decentralization is
altogether bad for the economy. While economic growth, as measured by
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gross domestic product (GDP) may be a key macroeconomic objective,
several studies have shown that economic growth may not be tantamount to
human development. Studies have also shown that fiscal decentralization
positively influences public service provision, especially in the low income
countries. In low income countries, decentralization has higher coverage rates
than centralization for critical public services like health and education.
Khaleghian (2003) investigated the impact of decentralization on the
provision of a basic public service, health. Using a time series data set of 140
low and middle income countries from 1980 to 1997, the author found that
decentralization led to higher coverage rates than centralized ones, with an
average difference of 8.5 percent for measles and DTP3 vaccines
immunization. This implies that decentralization influences positively health
service delivery in low income countries and therefore the development of
human resource.
Although, there is a bulk literature on the determinants of human
development, there is still scanty work on the impact of fiscal decentralization
on human resource development, especially in developing countries like
Nigeria. Hasan (2000) based on the annual human development report of
UNDP, investigated the determinants of the level of human development for
various economies. The results showed that the level of per capita real GDP,
its rate of growth, expenditure on military and the state of income distribution
were the main determinants of human development.
The study found an increasing function of the level of per capita income on
human development. The relationship was stronger in non-linear specification
of the relationship suggesting that countries with low incomes in earlier stages
of development tend to pay increasing attention to human development up to a
stage. However, they tend to increasingly relax in the effort with further
improvement in per capita income.
In addition, the study found that military expenditure was unmistakably
negatively related with human resource development in low income countries.
Surprisingly, inequalities in the distribution of income tended to go with
higher levels of human development. One possible reason for this could be
that increase in disparities might compensate for the increased disadvantage of
the poor by enabling the rich to add even more to their capabilities as they
could use the resources better.
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Human development, an imperative for poverty alleviation, is concerned with
improvements in the quality of people as agents of production in developing
economies. Theoretically, the provision of infrastructure has positive
influence on human development. For instance, the provision of social
infrastructure such as education and health unequivocally improves the quality
of human resources and capabilities. Empirical literature has, however, shown
that this could not be very true with respect to expenditure on infrastructure in
most developing countries.
Bardhan and Mookherjee (1998, 2003) in their theoretical model compared
the delivery of public goods under decentralized and centralized systems.
Using this model, they demonstrated that the positive impact of
decentralization on service delivery was conditional on the political context.
First, they showed that the welfare consequences of decentralizing service
delivery would depend on the method chosen for financing local governments.
Leaning on the existing empirical literature, they argued that expenditure
decentralization not accompanied by revenue decentralization limited the
expansionary effect of decentralization on service levels. However, they
cautioned that revenue decentralization might lead to the presence of local
capture by local elites which might not be welfare enhancing. Though user
fees mechanism offers some distinctive advantages over the traditional
intergovernmental fiscal grants, they cautioned that it fails when the objective
of government is redistribution across communities or when a significant
proportion of intended beneficiaries do not afford to pay for the service.6
Thus, the question: Does fiscal decentralization improves human well-being?
Has only one answer, it depends.
Agu and Onodugo (2009) using data from selected states in Nigeria analysed
the impact of infrastructure decentralization on poverty reduction. They
argued that decentralization could be a blessing or curse depending on the
quality of the local bureaucracy and capacity to formulate and execute
development projects.
6

User fees mechanism provides flexibility in service delivery, ensures higher service delivery
compared to intergovernmental grants, owing to the avoidance of asymmetric information,
inter-community free-riding and bargaining distortions inherent in a system of
intergovernmental fiscal grants.
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From the foregoing literature review, this study is guided by the following
specific objectives: to examine the long run relationship among fiscal
decentralization, economic growth and human resource development in
Nigeria as well as remedy the neglect of specific research on this topic. To
achieve these objectives, the study uses the bounds testing cointegration
procedure (Pesaran, et al. 2001) and the VAR Granger causality/Block
exogeneity Wald tests.
3.0

Trend Analysis of Fiscal Decentralization, Economic Growth and
Human Resource Development in Nigeria.

Federal, State and local governments’ expenditures and internally generated
revenues were obtained from the CBN Statistical Bulletin and Annual
Reports. Except for a few states, like Lagos and Kano, internally generated
revenues are generally low across the states. In other words, revenue
decentralization is at its low ebb. The bulk of the revenue is centrally collected
and shared among the states. In view of this, the study focused on expenditure
decentralization. This is measured as the total expenditure of state
governments and local governments over federal government.7 The evolutions
of federal and sub-national (state and local) governments’ expenditures for the
period 1980 to 2012 are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Index of Fiscal Decentralization in Nigeria, 1980-2012
Year

Fiscal Decentralization

1980-1984
1985-1989
1990-1994
1995-1999
2000-2004

1.61
1.04
0.92
0.57
3.30

2005-2008
2009-2012

3.94
3.38

Source: Authors’ Computations using data from CBN Statistical Bulletin, 2012.

Several interesting patterns can be detected from these data. During this
period, sub-national expenditure exceeded federal government spending in
sixteen out of the 29 years. It was mostly during the mid-1980s and early
1990s that federal government expenditure was greater than the sub-national
7

Note that local government expenditure data were not available for most years. Data from
1980 to 1992 were interpolated on the basis of the available data from 1993 to 2009.
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total spending. This should not be surprising bearing in mind that during this
period the military was in government and the country almost became a
unitary state. With the return to democracy in 1999, sub-national total
spending was consistently higher than federal expenditure, sometimes tripling
the federal government spending (figure 1).

N million

Figure 1: Trends in Subnational and Federal Expenditures,
1980-2012 (Nmillion)
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Figure 2: Index of Fiscal Decentralization in Nigeria, 1980 to
2012
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Figure 2 clearly shows that fiscal decentralization tends to increase during the
democratic era. On the other hand, percentage changes in the index of human
development adjusted for inequality in Nigeria was below one percent (figure
3). It was lowest during the military era and even recorded a negative
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percentage in 1984, 1986 and 1987, the period of structural adjustment
programme (SAP) as well as in 2011, perhaps due to the uncertainty
surrounding the 2011 general election. Figure 4 shows that the level of human
development in Nigeria falls below those of the continent (Africa) and global
level.
Figure 3: Changes in Human Development Index of
Nigeria, 1980 -2012
0.015
0.01
0.005
0
-0.005
-0.01
-0.015

Figure 4: Nigeria HDI versus Regional and Global HDI
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4.0

Data, scope and estimation procedure

4.1

Data definitions and sources

In order to examine the relationship between the variables, this study employs
the Nigeria annual time series from 1980 to 2012. Inequality-adjusted Human
Development Index (HDI) is adopted as a proxy for human resource
development and is obtained from the World Bank Development Indicators
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2014 and African Database 2013. Economic growth is defined as real GDP
per capita growth rate and extracted from Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical
Bulletin 2012.
There are different measures of fiscal decentralization, albeit there is a
consensus that an operational measure of decentralization is the share of
decentralized expenditures and revenues of state and local governments in the
nation’s total fiscal activities (Ubogu, 1982). However, these measures are not
free of problems. Kessing et al. (2005) identified three key problems
associated with these measures:
i.
ii.
iii.

These data do not contain information about the distribution of power
among the central and sub-national governments;
The sources of the revenues, intergovernmental transfers and other
grants are not taken into account; and
They do not account for the extent to which the jurisdictions’ tax
bases overlap.

Nevertheless, these data are widely used in empirical studies on the impact of
decentralization.8
4.2

Methodology

The study adopts the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL)/bounds testing
cointegration procedure to estimate the long run and short run relationships
and dynamic interaction among the variables of interest. Pesaran et al. (2001)
proposed an ARDL/Bounds Testing approach to investigate the existence of
cointegration relationship among variables. There are three specific
advantages associated with this approach:
(i)

(ii)

8

It circumvents the problem of the order of integration associated
with the Johansen likelihood approach (Johansen and Juselius,
1990);
Unlike most of the conventional multivariate cointegration
procedures, which are valid for large sample size, the bounds test

See Dreher (2006) for detailed discussion of other measures of decentralization.
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approach is suitable for small sample size study (Pesaran et al.,
2001); and
It provides unbiased estimates of the long-run model and valid tstatistics even when some of the regressors are endogenous (Harris
and Sollis, 2003).

The following ARDL model will be estimated in order to test the
cointegration relationship between the variables: fiscal decentralization,
economic growth, human resource development, labour and capital stocks.
p

 ln HDt  c0   1 ln HDt 1   2 ln FIS t 1   3 ln EGt 1  i  ln HDt i
i 1

q1

q2

j 0

l 0

  j  ln FIS t  j    l  ln EGt l   t

(1)

Where δi are the long run multipliers, c0 is the intercept and ɛt are white noise
errors.
The first step in the ARDL bounds testing approach is to estimate equation (1)
by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) in order to test for the existence of a longrun relationship among the variables by conducting an F-test for the joint
significance of the coefficients of the lagged levels of the variables, that is:
HN ; δ1= δ2= δ3= 0 against the alternative
HA ; δ1≠ δ2≠ δ3≠ 0
We denote the test which normalizes on HD by FHD (HD|EG, FIS). Two
asymptotic critical values bounds provide a test for cointegration when the
independent variables are I(d) [where 0 ≤ 𝑑 ≤ 1]: a lower value assuming the
regressors are I(0) and an upper value assuming purely I(1) regressors. If the
F-statistic is above the upper critical value, the null hypothesis of no long run
relationship can be rejected irrespective of the orders of integration for the
time series. Conversely, if the test statistic falls below the lower critical value,
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. Finally, if the statistic falls between the
lower and upper critical values, the result is inconclusive. The approximate
critical values for the F-statistic test were obtained from Pesaran et al (2001).
Once cointegration is established the conditional ARDL (p, q1, q2) long-run
model for HDt can be estimated as:
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p

q1

q2

i 1

j 0

l 0

ln HDt  c0  1 ln HDt i   2 ln FIS t  j   3 ln EGt l   t
(2)

This involves selecting the orders of the ARDL (P, q1, q2) model in the three
variables using Akaike Information Criteria (AIC). The next step is to obtain
the short-run dynamic parameters by estimating an error correction model
associated with the long-run estimates. This is specified as:
 ln HDt   
q2


l 0

l

p

i  ln HDt  i 
i 1

q1


j 0

j

 ln FIS t  j 

(3)

 ln EGt  l  ecmt 1   t

Here φ, ϕ, and γ are the short-run dynamic coefficients of the model’s
convergence to equilibrium and ϑ is the speed of adjustment.
5.0

Empirical Results

5.1

Unit roots Tests

Before embarking on the ARDL bounds test, the variables were tested to
determine their order of integration. This was done basically to ensure that the
variables were not I(2) stationary or of a higher order than I(1). According to
Outtara (2004), in the presence of I(2) variables the computed F-statistics
provided by Pesaran et al. (2001) are not valid because the bounds test is
based on the assumption that the variables are I(0) or I(1). Therefore, in order
to avoid spurious results, the times series have to be tested to determine their
data generation process.
Table 2: Dickey-Fuller GLS (Elliot-Rothenberg-Stock test) Unit root test
Variables
AIC lag
lnHD
0
ΔlnHD
0
lnEG
0
ΔlnEG
0
lnFIS
0
ΔlnFIS
0
Asymptotic critical values: 1%
5%

constant
1.4160
-3.3107
-0.2471
-5.8257
-1.3443
-6.8474
-2.5256
-1.9496

Trend and constant
-1.8731
-3.9915
-1.6127
-6.1491
-1.6998
-5.6698
-3.7700
-3.1900
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To implement the unit roots tests, Dickey-Fuller GLS unit root tests were
employed (Elliot et al. 1996). The test regressions included both constant and
trend for the log-level and first difference of the variables. The results
presented in table 2 show that all the time series used in this study are
stationary at first difference. In other words, the variables used in this study
are integrated of order one, I(1).
The variables are expressed in their natural logarithms. Δ denotes first
difference. **(*) denotes the rejection of the null hypothesis at 1(5)%
significance level.
5.2

Cointegration test

Using AIC as a guide, a maximum lag order of 4 was chosen for the
conditional ARDL VECM in equation (1). The F-statistic tests for the joint
null hypothesis that the coefficients of the lagged level variables are zero (i.e.
no long run relationship exists between them). Table 3 reports the results of
the calculated F-statistics when each variable is considered as dependent
variable in the ARDL OLS regressions.
Table 3: Results of Bounds Tests
Dependent Variable Lag F-statistic
lnHD
4
11.9752
lnFIS
4
3.1005
lnEG
4
3.8503

Probability
Outcome
0.0012
Cointegration
0.0673
No Cointegration
0.1519
Inconclusive

Notes: Asymptotic critical bounds are obtained from Table C2, Case III
unrestricted intercept and no trend for k=3 (Pesaran et al, 2001). Lower bound
I(0) =3.43 and upper bound I(1) =4.37 at 1% significance level.
When the regression is normalized on Human Resource Development (HD),
the calculated F-statistic 11.9752 is higher than the upper bound critical value
4.37 at the 1 percent level. Thus, the null hypothesis of no cointegration is
rejected, implying long-run cointegration relationships amongst the variables
when the regressions are normalized on HD. With respect to FIS, the results
from the table clearly show that the null of no cointegration could not be
rejected as the calculated F-statistic 3.1005 lies below the lower bound critical
value 3.43 at the 1% level. When the regression was normalized on Economic
Growth (EG), the calculated F-statistic 3.8503 is higher than the lower bound
critical value 3.43, but less than the upper bound of 4.37. Hence, no decision
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could be made about the long run relationship amongst the variables when the
regression is normalized on EG.
Following the establishment of a long-run cointegration relationship, equation
(2) was estimated. The results obtained by normalizing on human resource
development (HD) in the long run are reported in Table 4.
The estimated coefficients of the long run relationship show that economic
growth has a very significant impact on human development. However, the
coefficient of fiscal decentralization is negative and statistically significant.
This result implies that the past trend of fiscal decentralization had adverse
impact on current development of human resources. The reason for this is not
far-fetched, often time, so much is spent on infrastructure provision yet the
actual services when delivered at all is less than what private expenditure
would have accomplished. So much was ‘allocated’ to administrative
bureaucracy and nothing or very little was left for actual service. The
consequence could be abandoned projects which constitute inefficient
resource allocation and economic waste.
Table 4: Estimated Long run coefficients using the ARDL approach
Dependent Variable: LNHD
Regressor
Coefficient
Constant
LNHD(-1)
LNFIS(-4)
LNEG
R-squared
Adjusted Rsquared
Durbin-Watson
stat

-0.8199
0.7607
-0.0037
0.0485

Standard Error
0.2455
0.0867
0.0015
0.0133

t-Statistic

Prob(tstatistic)

-3.3398**
8.7740**
-2.4001*
3.6404**

0.0028
0.0000
0.0249
0.0014

0.9962

F-statistic

2035.63

0.9957

Prob(F-statistic)

0.0000

2.1837

**(*) denotes 1%(5%) significance level.

This result is not surprising for a developing country. Decentralization tends
to complicate the political games at the sub-national level and thereby
increase the local veto power and number of rent-seekers in the polity. In
other words, decentralization is tantamount to increased fragmentation of
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political arenas. In Nigeria, where corruption in politics seems endemic, it is
replicated at each level of governance, both central and sub-national, and this
automatically drains public expenditure of the desired positive impact in terms
of service delivery. According to Ebel (1998), Western countries mainly
decentralize in order to provide public services in a more cost-effective way,
whereas low income countries pursue decentralization for political and social
reasons to overcome macroeconomic instability and ineffective governance.
The costs of pursuing political and social objectives often overwhelm the
economic efficiency goals. Thus, decentralization becomes a growth-limiting
factor in low income countries.
The long-run results also reveal that previous states of human development
significantly impacted on the current state. Indeed, a 10 percent improvement
in the past human development is capable of improving current human
development status by 7.6 percent.
The results of the short-run dynamic coefficients associated with the long run
relationships obtained from the ECM equation (3) are given in Table 5. The
signs of the short run dynamic impacts are maintained to the long run.
Table 5: Estimated Coefficients of the Short run Dynamic Error correction
Model
Dependent Variable: D(LNHD)
Regressor
Coefficient
Constant
-0.000275
Δ(LNHD(-1))
0.602573
Δ(LNEG)
0.069250
Δ(LNFIS)
0.001610
Δ(LNFIS(-1))
0.003035
ECM(-1)
R-squared
Adj. R-squared
Durbin-Watson stat

-0.963877
0.709989
0.637487
1.792761

Standard Error t-Statistic
0.001683 -0.163520
0.162014 3.719266
0.019684 3.518019
0.002194 0.733869
0.002125 1.428237

Prob (t-statistic)
0.8718
0.0014
0.0022
0.4715
0.1687

0.261338 -3.688240

0.0015

Akaike info criterion
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

-7.927794
9.792601
0.000075

Normality test: Jarque Bera 1.7424 (0.4184) Serial Correlation Test: Breusch
Godfrey LM 3.0990 (0.0697) ARCH test 0.1025 (0.7517) Ramsey RESET 2.2476
(0.1345)

Both previous human development status and economic growth have positive
and highly significant impact on current human development. However, the
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coefficients of fiscal decentralization are not significant at 5 percent level
though with a positive sign.
The equilibrium error correction coefficient (ecm) estimate of -0.96 is highly
significant, with the correct sign. This implies a high speed of adjustment to
equilibrium after a shock. Approximately 96 percent of disequilibria from the
previous year’s shock converge back to the long run equilibrium in the current
year. Other diagnostic tests for the residual of the regression and model
specification performed well. The residuals are normally distributed and there
is no higher order serial correlation in the model. The RAMSEY test for
misspecification did not reject the null hypothesis of no misspecification.
Thus, the functional form of the model is appropriate.
5.3

VAR Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Tests

Cointegration and long run relationships do not define the direction of
causality. Table 6 shows the results of the VEC Granger causality/Block
Exogeneity tests.
Table 6: VEC Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests
Dependent variable: D(LNHD)
Excluded
Chi-sq
D(LNFIS)
13.08965
D(LNEG)
7.165608
All

17.03766

Df
3
3

Prob.
0.0044
0.0668

6

0.0091

Dependent variable: D(LNFIS)
Excluded

Chi-sq

Df

Prob.

D(LNHD)
D(LNEG)

7.233900
5.086164

3
3

0.0648
0.1656

All

8.996465

6

0.1738

Dependent variable: D(LNEG)
Excluded

Chi-sq

Df

Prob.

D(LNHD)
D(LNFIS)

0.595593
14.62614

3
3

0.8974
0.0022

All

15.47404

6

0.0089
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The essence of this test is to investigate the causal links amongst the variables;
fiscal decentralization, economic growth and human resource development.
This test is important in the sense that it informs us about the direction of
causality amongst the variables. There are basically three possible outcomes:
unidirectional, bidirectional or neutral relationships.
A chi-square statistic of 13.09 for fiscal decentralization when human
development is dependent variable implies that FIS is exogenous in the human
resource development regression. Similarly, economic growth has a moderate
chi-square statistic of 7.17. Thus, human resource development is Granger
caused by these two variables. In other words, HD is influenced by FIS and
EG. The null of block exogeneity is refuted when HD is taken as the
dependent variable. This suggests that HD is influenced by FIS and EG when
they are taken together. The null hypothesis of block exogeneity is also
refuted when EG is taken as the dependent variable (0.0089). However, HD
does not Granger caused EG but FIS Granger causes EG given the high chisquare statistic of 14.62.
When FIS is taken as the dependent variable, the chi-square statistics of 7.23
and 5.09 for HD and EG, respectively, are not significant. Thus the null of
block exogeneity is not refuted when FIS is taken as the dependent variable.
In conclusion, the tests reveal that human resource development has a
unidirectional relationship with FIS and EG, with these two variables acting as
the determinants of HD.
5.4

Policy Implication

Various policy implications that can be drawn from this paper are:
A long-run unidirectional relationship exists amongst fiscal decentralisation,
human resource development and economic growth. However, in the shortrun, expenditure decentralisation has no impact on human resource
development. This implies that short-run inefficiency in the application of
resources would accumulate to long-term negative effect. Thus, policy should
be targeted at efficient application or management of resources in the shortrun to avoid long-run negative effects.
Human resource development in Nigeria is determined by such factors as
expenditure decentralisation and economic growth. The result has shown a
strong positive and significant relationship between economic growth and
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human resource development. Thus, policy measures must be put in place to
grow the economy. Also, efficient methods must be adopted to allocate
resources at the sub-national level of government. What is important is that
the various monetary and fiscal policy measures needed to ensure
macroeconomic stability must be adopted to ensure the realisation of
macroeconomic goals of economic growth, price stability, low unemployment
and balance of payment.
For the negative impact of fiscal decentralisation, especially expenditure
decentralisation, on human resource development, there should be adequate
reform measures at the sub-national level of government to ensure
transparency, accountability and efficient application of the available
resources with the intent of reversing the negative relationship observed
between expenditure decentralisation and human resource development. This
is intended to achieve better and improved human resource development with
its attendant positive consequences for the economy.
6.0

Summary and Conclusion

This paper analyzed the impact of fiscal decentralization, especially
expenditure decentralization, on human resource development using Nigerian
data from 1980 to 2012. The results show that expenditure decentralization in
Nigeria influences human development. The theoretical expectation that
decentralization would improve service delivery through proximity and
regional competition is not found. This puts a big question mark on the quality
of public expenditure in the federation. The pattern and nature of expenditure
decentralization in Nigeria seem to support inefficient application of resources
with increased cost of governance rather than ensuring cost effectiveness in
the provision of public services. To this end, the study suggests that key
reforms are required to improve transparency and accountability at all levels
of governance in order to make fiscal decentralization supportive of economic
growth and human resource development.
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